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COVID-19 and Numeracy: How about Them Numbers?
Abstract
Quantitative efforts to understand the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic need to be viewed through
the lens of social construction. I begin by comparing the efforts to quantitatively measure the plague in
London in 1665. Then I develop five propositions for studying the social construction of statistics: (1)
facts are social constructions; (2) measuring involves making decisions, (3) counting is not
straightforward; (4) all comparisons involve choices; and (5) social patterns shape numbers. After
examining how these propositions affect what we know about COVID-19, I consider their implications for
moving beyond mathematics when approaching numeracy.
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Introduction: The View from 1665
The opening pages of Daniel Defoe’s (1968 [1722]) A Journal of the Plague Year
should seem familiar to readers in 2020.1 The book begins in December 1664,
when Londoners were trying to figure out just what was happening. The plague
had struck Holland in 1663 and 1664; now two men were reported dead from the
disease in London. Would those be the only cases, or would there be more?
People turned to the weekly Bills of Mortality (an accounting kept by the
Worshipful Company of Parish Clerks), which were supposed to track burials in
London:
. . . the usual Number of Burials in a Week, in the Parishs of St Giles’s in the Fields, and
St Andrew’s Holburn, were from 12 to 17 or 19 each, a few more or less; but from the
Time that the Plague first began in St Giles’s Parish, it was observ’d, that the ordinary
Burials encreased in Number considerably. For Example, . . .
Jan. 30 to Feb. 7
Feb. 7 to 14

St Giles’s
St Andrew’s
St. Giles’s

21
23
24

(p. 3)

The usual Number of Burials [for the whole of London] within the Bills of Mortality for a
Week, was from about 240 or thereabouts, to 300. The last was esteem’d a pretty high
Bill; but after this we found the Bills successively encreasing, as follows:
Buried Increased
Dec. the 20th to the 27th
291
27 to the 3 Jan.
349
85
January 3 to the 10
394
45
10 to the 17
415
21
17 to the 24
474
59
(p. 4)

So more people were dying, but were these deaths from plague? Relative few
deaths were ascribed to that cause, but “. . . it began to be suspected, that the
Plague was among the People at that end of the Town; and that many had died of
it, tho’ they had taken Care to keep it as much from the Knowledge of the Publick,
as possible . . .” (2). There were competing diagnoses: in the week of April 18–25
“there was buried in St Giles’s Parish 30, whereof two of the Plague, and 8 of the
Spotted-Feaver, which was looked upon as the same thing . . .” (5). Eventually,
efforts to obtain more accurate counts emerged: during May 23–30: “. . . the
Burials in St Giles’s were 53, a frightful Number! of whom they set down but 9 of
the Plague: But on an Examination more strictly by the Justices of the Peace, and
1

Defoe was a small child in 1665. He would have grown up listening to accounts of people who
had vivid recollections of the plague, but his book, much like his better-known Robinson Crusoe
and Moll Flanders, is a fictional account told in the first person.
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at the Lord Mayor’s Request, it was found there were 20 more, who were really
dead of the Plague in that Parish, but had been set down of the Spotted-Feaver or
other Distempers, besides others concealed” (6).2
These passages indicate that, when faced with a serious but uncertain threat,
seventeenth-century Londoners made efforts to quantitatively measure what was
happening. In other words, Defoe’s book—written fifty years before the word
statistic was coined—describes the social construction of statistics.3
These dynamics seem strikingly familiar, even though Defoe was describing
events more than 350 years ago. It is easy to assume that our situation ought to be
very different from that of seventeenth-century London. After all, (1) we have a
vastly improved medical system founded on a completely different and vastly
superior understanding of disease, with better trained professionals, more accurate
diagnoses, and more effective treatments; (2) we have a vastly more sophisticated
public health system to trace and control the spread of epidemics; (3) we have
vastly more scientific knowledge, as well as institutions to foster its growth and
spread; and (4) we have vastly more effective means of communication to spread
information. And yet, much like Defoe’s Londoners, we find ourselves in the early
stages of an epidemic, struggling to use numbers to make sense of what’s
occurring.
In spite of the obvious differences between then and now, we can see the
similarities. I started writing this during the second half of April 2020, when
COVID-19 coverage preoccupied a large share of the news media’s attention.
When I began writing, infections in the US had not yet peaked, and there were
bitter debates about the nature of the threat and the best policies to address it.
There seemed to be troubling trade-offs between the public health officials’
recommendations to maintain social distancing in order to minimize infections
and deaths, and the need to restore an economy which had been terribly damaged
as a consequence of those recommendations. (Defoe’s narrator, a sadler, faced this
dilemma at an individual level: “I had two important things before me; the one
was the carrying on my Business and Shop; which was considerable; and the other
was the Preservation of my Life in so dismal a Calamity . . . which however great
it was, my Fears perhaps as well as other Peoples, represented to be much greater
than it could be” [9].)
Obviously, mine is a preliminary account—notes for a rough draft if you will.
Our understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic will evolve during the coming
The diarist Samuel Pepys also lived through the 1665 plague: “At the end of August, he cited the
bill of mortality as having recorded 6,102 victims of the plague, but feared ‘that the true number of
the dead this week is near 10,000,’ mostly because the victims among the urban poor weren’t
counted” (Lotz-Heumann 2020).
3
On the social construction of statistics, see Best (2004; 2008; 2012).
2
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weeks, months, and years. I also need to make it clear that I have no training or
background in epidemiology; I am just a sociologist who studies social problems
by focusing on how people talk about public issues. Therefore, I am not going to
reference the rapidly growing medical literature on COVID-19; rather, I am
interested in exploring how the pandemic was discussed in public forums—in
news coverage and various online posts. I have ignored the fleeting whims of
social media and the noise from television’s talking heads, in favor of better
thought-out, more coherent written statements. Still, examining how people talked
about COVID-19 during the early months of 2020 allows us to identify facets of
this topic that are relevant to those interested in numeracy. I present these as a list
of observations.

Facts Are Social Constructions
Many of us had a third-grade social studies unit on facts and opinions, wherein we
learned that facts are really, indisputably true, whereas opinions are statements
that some people may consider to be true, even as other people disagree. Thus,
“three times three equals nine” is a fact, while “Superman is the best superhero” is
an opinion. However straightforward this may seem to third-graders, things are a
bit more complicated than that.
It is not difficult to find people who consider it a fact that the Bible is the one
true word of God, and others who consider it a fact that the Koran is the one true
word of God. Let’s remember that this dispute is not some minor disagreement; it
is the root cause of many, many people being killed over centuries. This example
tells us that facts are products of particular social groupings at particular times and
in particular places. When I went to school, I learned it was a fact that our solar
system had nine planets; my grandchildren are learning the fact that there are only
eight. Labeling something a fact always occurs within a particular social context.
Understand that I am not suggesting that all claims are equally true or some
relativistic nonsense of that sort, but different groups have standards for
determining what is factual. Scientists demand empirical evidence to weigh
claims, just as historians have standards for judging evidence from the past, and
theologians for correctly reading holy writ. Thanks to the Enlightenment, our
world shares considerable consensus about lots of facts: most people accept that
matter is composed of atoms, the earth orbits the sun, the continents are in motion,
and so on—and yet we know that these were once ideas that were seen as dubious.
Where there is overwhelming evidence, we may think it very unlikely that
knowledge we currently consider factual will ever be overturned. At the same
time, we have to acknowledge that knowledge that we may be confident is factual
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(e.g., I—and most of the people I know—don’t doubt that evolution is a fact),
continues to be disputed in other social settings.
All of this is relevant in a world where some people denounce “fake news” or
defend “alternative facts,” even as others pound the table and insist that the facts
are on their side. Declaring that something is a fact hardly guarantees that debate
will disappear, and often people on opposing sides of a debate insist that their
views are the ones actually founded on facts.

Measuring Involves Making Decisions
When numbers appear in discussions of public issues and public policy, they
almost always involve attempts to measure what is occurring. We are used to
reifying these numbers; we talk about the crime rate or the unemployment rate as
though they are straightforward facts, accurate statements about the amount of
crime or unemployment. In so doing, we tend to gloss over the rather messy
procedures used to create those numbers. Assume we want to measure the extent
of crime. Before we can count crimes, we must first define just what we will
consider criminal. Notice that many crimes are hidden because people try to
conceal the crimes they commit, and we lack any sort of platform from which we
can omnisciently identify every crime that has occurred. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (the agency that calculates the crime rate) gets around this problem
by surveying local law enforcement agencies and asking them how many
instances of particular crimes (such as criminal homicide and forcible rape) in
their jurisdiction came to their attention during the previous month. In other
words, the crime rate is actually the rate of crimes known to the police, and there
are other issues: not all law enforcement agencies report their data to the FBI,
there are occasional scandals revealing that an agency has deliberately
underreported crimes, and so on.
Every effort to measure social conditions has analogous limitations.4 A long
series of choices shapes whatever is being counted and how the counting occurs.
When we talk about the resulting numbers as facts (e.g., equating the crime rate
with the amount of crime), we ignore the very real processes by which those
numbers are socially constructed, and the inevitable flaws and limitations in the
results.
In the case of COVID-19, measurement choices are complex. News coverage
tends to highlight two sorts of statistics: the numbers of cases, and the numbers of
4

There are large social science literatures discussing the limitations that lead to inaccuracies in
crime rates, unemployment rates, the census, and so on. For an introduction to some of these
issues, see Nagaraja (2020).
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deaths. Alas, neither of these is at all straightforward. Koerth et al. (2020) offer a
basic formula for calculating the number of deaths from COVID-19:
size of susceptible population x infection rate x fatality rate = total deaths
However, this formula is deceptively simple. There is evidence that
susceptibility varies wildly by age, gender, social class, and individual health
factors, so that any effort to measure the susceptible population must weigh the
proportion of people in different risk groups. The infection rate is and will remain
uncertain until effective, systematic testing methods are available; while people
who exhibit the most severe symptoms are likely to seek medical care and be
noticed, other infected people may have moderate or mild symptoms—or no
symptoms at all. And until we have a clear sense of the infection rate, it will be
impossible to calculate an accurate fatality rate.
Early attempts to measure the disease tended to involve small-scale, localized
studies (on a cruise ship or in a city or some other geographic area), and these led
to very different estimates for both infection rates and fatality rates:
The data on Covid-19 differs wildly from country to country. Look at the figures for Italy
and Germany. At the time of writing, Italy has 69,176 recorded cases and 6,820 deaths, a
rate of 9.9 per cent. Germany has 32,986 cases and 157 deaths, a rate of 0.5 per cent. Do
we think that the strain of virus is so different in these nearby countries as to virtually
represent different diseases? Or that the populations are so different in their susceptibility
to the virus that the death rate can vary more than twentyfold? If not, we ought to suspect
systematic error, that the Covid-19 data we are seeing from different countries is not
directly comparable. Look at other rates: Spain 7.1 per cent, US 1.3 per cent, Switzerland
1.3 per cent, France 4.3 per cent, South Korea 1.3 per cent, Iran 7.8 per cent (Lee 2020a).

Undoubtedly this discrepancy will all get sorted out over time, but in the short
run, measurements have produced limited and contradictory information. This is
important because efforts to model the course of the disease inevitably require
plugging best-guess estimates of these various factors into their formulas;
depending on which estimates are chosen, the models’ forecasts can be very
different, and they can change from day to day as new data become available.5

5

The COVID Projections Tracker (2020) is an online tool that makes the day-to-day changes in
model projections visible. For instance, at the time I wrote this paper, the University of
Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (the IHME, whose model was frequently
cited by the media) projections for the death toll had ranged from 60,307 (on April 16) to 93,762
(on March 31). As states began relaxing their social distancing earlier than public health officials
recommended, the IHME estimates rose markedly. See also Best and Boice (2020).
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Counting Is Not Straightforward
Precisely because so much about COVID-19 is unknown, the most authoritative
numbers tend to come from the records kept by established bureaucracies, in
particular, medical records and death records. These records are health-system
choke points even in normal, non-pandemic times; that is, it is relatively easy to
get fairly accurate counts of the cases that appear at these points in the system. At
least in theory, everyone who becomes very sick should wind up seeing a doctor
and being admitted to a hospital (institutions that keep records), and all fatalities
should be recorded in death certificates. This reasoning is why the news media
focus on the number of cases (i.e., the number of people being treated for COVID19, which, in practice, means the number who have been admitted to hospitals)
and the number of deaths attributed to the disease. (Things haven’t changed all
that much: recall Defoe describing Londoners relying on the bills of mortality’s
burial records to track the plague’s spread.) At first glance, depending on the
number of cases and the number of fatalities might seem commonsensical, but any
time we count anything, we are inevitably forced to choose—to decide what to
count and how to go about counting (Stone, in press).
So what is a COVID-19 case? In many places, being counted as a case
requires being admitted to a hospital, tested, and identified as someone infected by
COVID-19. Defining cases this way is bureaucratically convenient: we
presumably know how many hospitals there are, we can arrange for them to
cooperate in reporting the cases they identify, and the people who are to be
counted arrive on site. The problem is that counting patients in hospitals
inevitably undercounts the actual number of cases. We know that many people
infected with COVID are asymptomatic; that is, they have the virus but not the
disease. Others have mild or moderate cases; they feel sick, even quite sick, but
are discouraged from seeking hospital care unless they experience serious
difficulty breathing. Still others—particularly in the US—may be very sick but
lack health insurance, so are reluctant to present themselves for treatment.
All of this means that using the number of patients in hospitals to count cases
will severely underestimate the extent of the problem. The solution—and there is
widespread agreement on this point—is to have testing programs that can identify
infected people so they can be isolated before they infect others. The problem is
that tests have been in short supply, causing different localities to adopt different
procedures for deciding who gets tests, which in turn affects the numbers of cases
identified (Silver 2020). Without widespread testing using a standard protocol, the
numbers of cases reported are likely to undercount the extent of the disease.6
6

Because testing covers only small, usually nonrandom samples, there are efforts to devise more
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What, exactly, is a COVID-19 death? We may imagine a case—call him
“Adam”—who gets very sick, is tested, and is found to be infected with COVID19. He is admitted to the hospital, succumbs, and winds up with a death certificate
that lists COVID-19 as the cause of death. Adam’s case represents the
circumstances that are most likely to be accurately counted. But what about Betty
and Carl, both residents in nursing homes who have long lists of serious chronic
health problems such that they are already near death, and who become infected
with COVID-19? Perhaps Betty’s death certificate mentions COVID-19, but
Carl’s does not (Perls 2020). And what about Doris and Edward, elderly people
living alone who become infected and are discovered dead in their homes—
perhaps Doris’s body is tested and the death is attributed to COVID-19, while
Edward’s death is assigned some other cause? And so on. These examples suggest
that COVID-19 death tolls are almost certainly undercounts (Koerth 2020), just as
the crime rate inevitably undercounts the actual number of crimes.
At the same time, it is also possible for overcounting to occur. Perhaps a
hospital’s deaths are accidentally counted twice in tallying total deaths in a state,
or:
Consider some examples: an 87-year-old woman with dementia in a nursing home; a 79year-old man with metastatic bladder cancer; a 29-year-old man with leukaemia treated
with chemotherapy; a 46-year-old woman with motor neurone disease for 2 years. All
develop chest infections and die. All test positive for Covid-19. Yet all were vulnerable to
death by chest infection from any infective cause (including the flu). Covid-19 might have
been the final straw, but it has not caused their deaths (Lee 2020b).7

Common sense tells us that death is an absolute, something that seems like it
ought to be easy to count, but every count depends on the choices made. Even if a
bureaucracy establishes a clear definition of what counts as a COVID-19 death
and a set of procedures that ensures that definition is implemented in a thorough
and evenhanded manner, there is no reason to assume that the authorities in other
jurisdictions will use the same definition or procedures (Brown et al. 2020).
Moreover, as concern about an epidemic increases over time, the definitions and
procedures for recording deaths often change, making it difficult to compare
counts across time.
So far, I have been arguing that even people of good will can mess up
counting. Beyond that, there are cases of intentional underreporting, attempts to
disguise how bad things are. The most glaring example involves China, where
representative methods, such as sampling DNA samples from wastewater and determining which
proportion show evidence of the disease (Chakradhar 2020). Kaplow (2020) is an example of calls
for randomized testing.
7
The numeracy literature tends to speak of undercounting and overcounting as false negatives and
false positives (Boersma and Willard 2008).
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COVID-19 originated. While the Chinese government did announce that the
coronavirus was spreading, there is considerable evidence that their reports
downplayed the extent of the problem (Associated Press 2020; Bloomberg 2020;
Davidson 2020). In addition, the World Health Organization seems to have
uncritically accepted China’s reporting and delayed announcing that there was a
“public health emergency of international concern” until January 30 (FeldwischDrentrup 2020). Similarly, other authoritarian regimes have produced dubious
reports (e.g., North Korea continued insisting it had no COVID-19 cases long
after both China and South Korea acknowledged that the disease was in their
countries) (Walsh 2020). And, as weeks went by and the debate about rolling
back social distancing became more intense, there were complaints that officials
in some US states were defining cases in ways that would increase or decrease
their numbers (Koerth 2020).
One way to try to grasp the extent of undercounting is to compare the
acknowledged COVID-19 death toll with the ordinary number of deaths in the
same jurisdiction during the same time of year. Say that records show that a place
routinely has around 500 deaths during the first week in April, and there were
1,000 deaths that week during the spread of the virus; this suggests that COVID19 increased the death toll by 500 deaths. Once people began to examine such
data, it became clear that the level of undercounting was significant (Giles 2020;
Wu and McCann 2020; Wu et al. 2020). In some cases, there were efforts to
correct the undercounts by retroactively reclassifying causes of death (Goodman
and Rashbaum 2020).

All Comparisons Involve Choices
It is often hard to know what to make of a number. Is it large or small?
Ordinarily, placing a figure in some interpretive context requires making some
sort of comparison. In the case of COVID-19 numbers, three sorts of comparisons
predominated: comparisons with other epidemics; comparisons across geographic
units, such as countries, states, or cities; and comparisons with other causes of
death.

Comparisons with Other Epidemics
Epidemic diseases are not uncommon. Just since the year 2000, Americans’
attention has been drawn to SARS (2003), H1N5 flu (2005), H1N1 flu (2009),
West Nile virus (2012), MERS (2013), Ebola (2014), and Zika virus (2016)
(David J. Sencer CDC Museum 2020). US media, particularly in the cases of
H1N5 and Ebola, treated these as major threats (Best 2008). Dozens of other
disease outbreaks occurred in other countries (World Health Organization 2020).
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Yet, with the exception of the flu, which circulates in new variants each year,
none of these epidemics claimed many lives in the US.
The last major epidemic to cause widespread deaths in the U.S. was the socalled Spanish flu of 1918–20 (Barry 2004). It killed more—perhaps hundreds of
thousands more—than half a million people in the US, and over 100 million
worldwide. But of course, the medicine of 100 years ago was markedly less
effective than it is today, so it is hard to compare the terrible devastation of the
1918 pandemic with what is likely to happen with COVID-19. Similarly, it is
always possible to go further back into the historical record, as I have done by
making comparisons with Defoe’s account of the 1665 plague. History offers all
manner of examples of terrible epidemics, such as the Black Death of the midfourteenth century, but again, living conditions, transportation, and medicine were
vastly different in earlier eras. It is hard to conclude much from these examples,
except we may find comfort in the realization that, although modern
transportation has enabled COVID-19 to span the globe with astonishing rapidity,
it is unlikely to kill anything like the number of victims in earlier epidemics.

Comparisons Across Geography
Commentators on COVID-19 have made far more use of comparisons among
countries, states, or cities, easily accomplished because the agencies that keep
records on cases and deaths have responsibility for counting events in their
jurisdictions, and researchers are almost certain to sample cases from particular
places. In addition, public policies for dealing with COVID-19 usually involve
government officials establishing rules for the areas they administer, and these
rules often vary both in their timing (i.e., how soon the policies were implemented
after the first local infections became known) and their stringency (i.e., both the
policies’ range and their enforcement can vary).
These various policies create what amount to natural experiments. If Location
A took action early (by closing schools, businesses, etc.) while Location B took
much longer to act, these differences might be expected to have effects on how
widely COVID-19 could spread, how much difficulty hospitals would have
dealing with the increase in patients, and the number of deaths in each location.
Commentators devoted a good deal of attention to such comparisons. For
instance, US state governors were praised or denounced for their actions (Scher
2020). Similarly, some countries adopted stricter policies, sometimes much
earlier in the disease outbreak. At least in the early weeks of the epidemic, taking
action quickly seemed to be fairly effective in minimizing the spread of the
disease (Glanz and Robertson 2020).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Comparisons with Other Causes of Death
COVID-19 can be lethal, of course, and the media constantly updated death tolls.
But how big a deal is COVID-19? After all, lots of people die every year. In 2017
(the most recent year for which complete data are available), more than 2.8
million people died in the US, and about 56 million worldwide (Kochanek et al.
2019; Ritchie and Roser 2019). While I was drafting this paper, the global death
toll surpassed 200,000, of which more than 50,000 were in the US—and of course
those figures will have certainly increased by the time anyone reads this. But do
those death tolls suggest that COVID-19 is a big problem, or a relatively minor
matter?
While the alarming tone of media coverage might make it seem obvious that
the coronavirus is a big deal, some commentators sought to downplay its largescale significance. This was particularly true during February and early March,
when the US death tolls were still very low, and there were even claims (not, to be
sure, by medical authorities) that the final US death toll might be in the hundreds.
Compared to the nearly three million deaths occurring each year in the US, a death
toll of 50,000, or 100,000, or even 200,000 might be seen as a relatively small
increase. After all, the flu kills tens of thousands of Americans each year, and
traffic accidents nearly 40,000. While we encourage people to buckle up and get a
flu shot, we see flu and traffic fatalities as ordinary, routine causes of death,
inevitable costs of living a large, complex society. We don’t implement social
isolation policies for the flu each year, so is it really necessary to take drastic
measures to fight the apparently more-or-less equivalent threat of COVID-19?
The answer, of course, is that the death toll during the first few weeks after
the sudden onset of the coronavirus and the annual tallies for deaths attributed to
flu or traffic fatalities are not really comparable (Faust 2020; Schulman et al.
2020). Traffic fatalities are spread out over 52 weeks, averaging roughly 700
deaths per week; after about only nine weeks, COVID-19 deaths far exceeded the
annual traffic death toll. Once we compare death tolls from different causes for,
say, a given week, the impact of the coronavrius becomes apparent: during the
week of April 6–12, COVID-19 killed more Americans than cancer (usually the
second leading cause of death), and nearly as many as heart disease. The threat
varied from place to place: in New York, Louisiana, and Washington, D.C.,
COVID-19 was the leading cause of death for that week; it killed more than ten
times as many people as heart disease in New York City (Keating and Esteban
2020).
The other feature of COVID-19’s spread is its dramatic increase in cases.
While there may be minor season fluctuations, deaths from heart disease, cancer,
and traffic accidents are spread more or less evenly across the year. In contrast,
there were markedly more COVID-19 cases and deaths in each successive week
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as the disease spread. The great danger, of course, was that serious cases would
outpace the capacity of hospitals and medical professionals to provide the needed
care. This process was slowed only with the implementation of social distancing
measures. Moreover, until there is an effective vaccine for COVID-19, it is likely
that, when social distancing is relaxed, there may be successive outbreaks that will
require again tightening social distancing.
In short, the dynamics of an epidemic make it very difficult to make
comparisons with the usual causes of deaths.

Social Patterns Shape Numbers
Early discussions of COVID-19 tended to gloss over how the epidemic was
shaped by social patterns, but by late April, a good deal of commentary focused
on ethnic differences. That is, it became clear that African Americans and Latinos
accounted for a much larger share of cases and deaths than their proportions in the
population (Daniels and Morial 2020). This almost certainly had nothing to do
with inter-group biological differences. Rather—as is so often the case—ethnicity
served as a proxy for thinking about social class. Our readiness to focus on
ethnicity—rather that class—reflects the presence of established groups of
advocates committed to drawing attention to the inequities of ethnicity in our
society, the terrible practical problems involved in measuring social class, and
Americans’ distaste for talking about class and their casual acceptance of racial
classifications.8
Class is important because it shapes susceptibility to disease generally, and
COVID-19 particularly. Those with higher incomes have better access to health
care in the US, they have lower risks (e.g., they are less likely to smoke, and their
work is less likely to expose them to health hazards), and as a result they have
longer life expectancies. Those with lower incomes are more likely to have
chronic health problems such as heart disease, lung disease, and diabetes that
make them more vulnerable to COVID-19. They also tend to live and work in
more crowded conditions that make social distancing more difficult.
News coverage tends to draw attention to atypical cases, such as reports of
celebrities sick with COVID-19, and it often treats infection as a purely biological
process while ignoring its social context. But epidemics do not spread evenly
through societies; they routinely disadvantage the poor (Hays 2009). Defoe noted
8

This is, as an anonymous reviewer points out, a complicated issue. Both race and class are of
course multi-faceted and socially constructed and have inspired vast social scientific literatures.
My point—and here I agree with most COVID-19 commentators—is that the disadvantaged
positions of ethnic minorities (their occupations, their residential areas, their access to medical
services, and so on) are fundamentally about their place in the economic order, i.e., their class.
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that the Londoners who could afford to do so tended to leave the city in 1665, just
as contemporary observers warn that those who were most vulnerable when the
COVID-19 epidemic began could be expected to bear a disproportionate share of
the risks as society tried to relax social distancing measures (Lane 2020). Raw
numbers, such as total cases or total deaths can obscure such social patterns.

The Relevance of COVID-19 for Numeracy
When advocates promote numeracy, they often emphasize the need for citizens to
have a grasp of mathematics and statistics:
Quantitatively literate citizens need to know more than formulas and equations. They
need a predisposition to look at the world through mathematical eyes, to see the benefits
(and risks) of thinking quantitatively about commonplace issues, and to approach
complex problems with confidence in the value of careful reasoning (Steen 2001).

And yet, because many of those most concerned with numeracy or statistical
literacy are mathematics or statistics educators, they tend to define innumeracy in
terms of an inability either to understand mathematical concepts, or to apply what
is learned in math classes to real-world problems. Thus, we are warned that many
people, faced with the need to paint a room of known dimensions, and knowing
how many square feet a gallon of paint should cover, still cannot figure out how
much paint they need to buy to do the job.9
COVID-19 clearly presents a major challenge to citizenship. It is important
that people understand the scope and nature of the problem, and that they can use
that knowledge to guide their behavior. And just as in Defoe’s plague year, this
knowledge involves trying to interpret numbers that reveal what’s going on. There
is some evidence that some quantitative arguments have been fairly widely
understood: the importance of “flattening the curve” has been repeated enough
that opinion polls suggest that a substantial majority of the population supports
the need for social distancing policies (Kirzinger et al. 2020). However, the
discourse that surrounds this issue is confused because not everyone can agree on
the facts. There are multiple contradictory rumors, and the nature of the most
common indicators is not well understood.10 While some of these problems may
9

There are even more fundamental ways to misunderstand numbers. There are many different
known coronaviruses. Some commentators—including a prominent conservative talk-radio
personality and a member of the White House staff—misunderstood the label COVID-19 to mean
that this was the 19th coronavirus to have been discovered and reasoned that, since the previous
eighteen had no memorable impact, fears about COVID-19 must be exaggerated. Of course, the
designation COVID-19 actually refers to the fact that the virus was identified in 2019.
10
Rumors and other misinformation related to epidemics are common (Kitta 2019). Defoe refers
to rumors at several points. In particular, the claim that the COVID-19 virus had originated in a
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involve some mathematical confusion, most of them also involve a fundamental
failure to understand and appreciate how claims about COVID cases, COVID
deaths, and so on are socially constructed. Teaching numeracy cannot be
understood only as a mathematical project that can ignore the way numbers are
brought into being.
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